Kuwait, Iraq Prepare Border for Departure of Anti-IS Forces
2026-09-284126 view
Iraq and Kuwait are entering a new phase of security and political relations as forces from the international coalition against the Islamic State group withdraw and Iraqi institutions take on security responsibilities.
The looming withdrawal, set to be completed on September 30, has focused Kuwait’s attention on southern Iraq. Kuwait’s security challenges do not begin at the frontier but extend well into Iraq, a landscape where official security structures intersect with political, economic and armed networks, with varying degrees of mobility and influence.
The environment is particularly sensitive in Iraq’s Basra governorate, which serves as the country’s southern economic gateway and provides access to Kuwait via the Safwan crossing—while simultaneously connecting to an extensive network of trade routes, ports, and maritime corridors in the Gulf. Consequently, stability in Basra has implications beyond domestic Iraqi affairs, directly impacting Kuwait’s security and economic calculations.
From this perspective, the Coalition’s withdrawal is prompting Kuwait to redefine its security relationship with Baghdad. This involves enhanced intelligence cooperation, information-sharing over borders and crossings, monitoring the movement of armed groups, and the bolstering of border guard capabilities. An Iraqi security delegation visited Kuwait on September 25 to discuss various security issues.
The economic aspect of ties between the two countries is likely to be a fundamental component of the new security equation. Kuwait views Iraq as a potential market and corridor for investment, transport, and energy. Consequently, projects involving connectivity, transport, ports, and trade-related investments remain highly sensitive to the security situation in southern Iraq.
Therefore, Baghdad’s ability to safeguard trade routes and border crossings—and to prevent armed groups and criminal networks from disrupting the flow of commerce—will be key to assessing the risks associated with investment and economic cooperation.
From Kuwait’s perspective, the most significant outcome will be the transition from a situation whereby the border was part of a clearly U.S.-led regional security framework to one that tests the Iraqi state’s own capacity to secure its southern periphery. Kuwaiti authorities will be closely watching their Iraqi counterparts’ performance in Basra, at border crossings, and in the maritime domain.
Accordingly, the withdrawal of the coalition does not automatically increase the risks to Kuwait, but it does elevate the importance of Iraqi dynamics within Kuwait’s security calculus. The more Baghdad succeeds in consolidating the state’s monopoly on force and establishing Iraqi security institutions as the sole entities capable of managing borders, crossings, and maritime zones, the lower the likelihood of regional tensions spilling over into Kuwait.
Conversely, the persistence of multiple power centers in Iraq—particularly in the economically and geographically vital southern regions—will closely tie the situation at the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border to regional power balances and the broader conflict involving Iran, the U.S., and their respective allies.
Consequently, Iraq’s southern border will remain one of the most sensitive points in the Gulf security equation, as it lies at the intersection of Iraqi, Kuwaiti, and Iranian interests within a rapidly shifting regional environment. Any shift in the region’s balance of power would directly impact the security of maritime corridors, the flow of trade, and the calculations of Gulf powers regarding Iraq.




